

FPA 2016  
62<sup>nd</sup> Annual Meeting of the Florida Philosophical Association

The 2016 meeting of the Florida Philosophical Association was held on 4-5 November at Florida Institute of Technology in Melbourne, Florida.

Friday, November 4

- 8:00 – 8:25 am        Coffee
- 8:30 – 9:20 am        1) 117A  
SPEAKER: Amanda McMullen (Miami) “Slurring Utterances as Acts of Separation”  
CHAIR: Bradford Stockdale (FSU)  
2) 117C  
SPEAKER: Peter Westmoreland (UF) “Act like a right-hander: Right hand bias in the construction of norms of lateral space usage”  
CHAIR: J. Michael Barker (UNC-Chapel Hill)  
3) 113A  
SPEAKER: Eric Rogers (Cincinnati) “Explicating Impact: Towards a General Definition of Impact in invasion biology”  
CHAIR: Sarah Vincent (UNF)
- 9:30 – 10:20 am     1) 117A  
SPEAKER: Bradford Stockdale (FSU) “Agency Incompatibilism and the Challenge from Chance”  
CHAIR: David M. DiQuattro (Stetson, Rollins)  
2) 117C  
SPEAKER: J. Michael Barker (UNC-Chapel Hill) “Whither Mechanism?”  
CHAIR: Lucas Worsham (UNF)  
3) 113A  
SPEAKER: Sarah Vincent (UNF) “On the Moral Actions and Moral Communities of Nonhuman Animals”  
CHAIR: Sophia Stone (Lynn)
- 10:30 – 11:20 am    1) 117A  
SPEAKER: David M. DiQuattro (Stetson, Rollins) “Access Problems and Virtue Ethics”  
CHAIR: Amanda McMullen (Miami)  
2) 117C  
SPEAKER: Lucas Worsham (UNF) “The Interpretation of Love as Shared Meaning”  
CHAIR: Peter Westmoreland (UF)  
3) 113A  
SPEAKER: Sophia Stone (Lynn) “Being in the Phaedo”  
CHAIR: Eric Rogers (Cincinnati)

12:00 – 1:40 pm	Lunch
1:45 – 2:35 pm	GRADUATE AWARD WINNER 117A SPEAKER: Adam Hauptfeld (Miami) “Access Internalism, Attention, and Perceptual Expertise” CHAIR: Joshua Rust (Stetson)
2:45 – 4:25	Teaching Symposium: Teaching Non-Western Philosophy 117A SPEAKERS: Paul Carelli (UNF) “Two Models for Including Non-Western Material in Introductory Philosophy Courses” Sarah Mattice (UNF) “The Five Buddhist Precepts and Introductory Ethics” Aaron Celler (UNF) “On Doubt with al-Ghazali and Descartes” CHAIR: Chair: Eugenio Zaldivar (Santa Fe)
2:45 – 3:35 pm	1) 117C SPEAKER: Joseph Long (Center for Philosophic Exchange) “Does Non-cognitivism Entail Wishful Thinking?” CHAIR: David DiDomenico (Miami) 2) 113A SPEAKER: Andrew Christman (FSU) “Response to Ginet on Direct Reference and Anomic Action Explanation” CHAIR: Larry Moralez (UCF)
3:45 – 4:35 pm	1) 117C SPEAKER: David DiDomenico (Miami) “Moral Perception, Inference, and Imagination” CHAIR: Joseph Long (Center for Philosophic Exchange) 2) 113A SPEAKER: Larry Moralez (UCF) “Enactive Neutral Monism” CHAIR: Andrew Christman (FSU)
4:45 – 5:45	Keynote Speaker 1 117A Ofelia Schutte (USF) "At the Margins of the History of Philosophy: Appeals to Reason by Sor Juana and Avellaneda." CHAIR: Andrew Aberdein (FIT)
6:30 – 7:30	President’s Reception
7:30 – 8:30	Dinner
8:30	Presidential Address SPEAKER: Michael Strawser (UCF) “TBA” CHAIR: Jonathan Matheson (UNF)

Saturday, November 5

8:30 – 9:20 am Business Meeting  
117A

9:30 – 10:20 am 1) 117A  
SPEAKER: Sungwoo Um (Duke) “Solving the Puzzle of Partiality”  
CHAIR: David McNaughton (FSU)  
2) 117C  
SPEAKER: Marija Jankovic (Davidson) and Greg Ray (UF) “Meaning, Publicity and Knowledge”  
CHAIR: James Gillespie (FSU)  
3) 113A  
SPEAKER: Justin Capes (Flagler) “Death, Betrayal, and a Guardian Angel”  
CHAIR: Steven Starke (USF – Tampa, St. Petersburg)  
4) 165A  
SPEAKER: Laurie Shrage (FIU) “Integration vs. Desegregation”  
CHAIR: Daniel Miller (FSU)

10:30 – 11:20 am 1) 117A  
SPEAKER: David McNaughton (FSU) & Piers Rawling (FSU)  
“Impartiality and Duties of Special Relationship”  
CHAIR: Sungwoo Um (Duke)  
2) 117C  
SPEAKER: James Gillespie (FSU) “Staying Safe with Sensitivity”  
CHAIR: Greg Ray (UF)  
3) 113A  
SPEAKER: Steven Starke (USF – Tampa, St. Petersburg) “A Suggested Taxonomy of Ethics”  
CHAIR: Justin Capes (Flagler)  
4) 165A  
SPEAKER: Daniel Miller (FSU) “In Defense of the Blameless Ignorance Principle”  
CHAIR: Laurie Shrage (FIU)

11:30 – 1:15 pm Lunch

1:30 – 2:20 pm Undergraduate Award  
117A  
SPEAKER: Joshua Myers (Miami) “Does Phenomenal Consciousness Overflow Attention? An Argument from Feature-Integration”  
CHAIR: Jonathan Matheson (UNF)

2:30 – 3:20 pm 1) 117A  
SPEAKER: Sally Ferguson (UWF) “Evolutionary Psychology and the Taxonomy, Diagnosis and Treatment of Mental Disorders”  
CHAIR: John Biro (UF)

2) 117C

SPEAKER: Brook Sadler (USF) "Passion and Affect in Moral Life: Making Room for Emotion in Kantian Ethics"

CHAIR: Marshall Thompson (FSU)

3) 113A

SPEAKER: Gordon Cooper (FSU) "Agent-Causal Libertarianism and Luck: A Response to Griffith"

CHAIR: Gabriel De Marco (FSU)

4) 165A

SPEAKER: Walker Page (Saint Louis) "Virtue Reliabilism and the Challenge of Defeat"

CHAIR: Mathew Taylor (FSU)

3:30 – 4:20 pm

1) 117A

SPEAKER: John Biro (UF) "Saving the Ship"

CHAIR: Sally Ferguson (UWF)

2) 117C

SPEAKER: Marshall Thompson (FSU) "Why Grownups Are Boring: How Everyday Acts Matter for an Immortal"

CHAIR: Brook Sadler (USF)

3) 113A

SPEAKER: Gabriel De Marco (FSU) "Manipulation and Intuitions: A Dilemma"

CHAIR: Gordon Cooper (FSU)

4) 165A

SPEAKER: Mathew Taylor (FSU) "Virtue and Right Revisited"

CHAIR: Walker Page (Saint Louis)

4:30 – 5:30 pm

Keynote Speaker 2

117A

Keya Maitra (UNC-Ashville) "Feminism and the Debate over Mental Content"

CHAIR: Michael Strawser (UCF)

## ABSTRACTS

### **Amanda McMullen "Slurring Utterances as Acts of Separation"**

In this paper, I propose that slurring utterances constitute a special sort of illocutionary act, which I call "separation", on the basis of both the distinctive kind of effect they produce (distancing), slur-users' speech patterns, and accounts from slur-targets. In separation, a slur-user, acting a member of "the humans", indicates her "distance" from the target of her slur, a member of the "non-humans". These groups are kinds: they are discrete, mutually exclusive groups, where the distinctions between them are underwritten by disparate essences. Each of these characteristics accounts for a conceptually separable aspect of distancing. My proposal is further supported by the well-documented existence of general psychological tendencies to think about certain types of human groups--the same ones for which we have slurs--as divided into humans and non-humans

(“self-humanization”) and as possessing essences with the traits I ascribe to them and allege are responsible for distancing (“psychological essentialism”).

**Peter Westmoreland “Act like a right-hander: Right hand bias in the construction of norms of lateral space usage”**

90% of human beings are right-handed. Naturally, the world humans have made for themselves is dexterocentric, or designed for encounter with the right hand, but little work has been done to illuminate the norms governing right hand bias. This paper develops one approach. I first delineate left and right-handed body compartments, based in general differences in how left and right-handers inhabit lateral space. With these phenomena as a reference point, I uncover three norms that depict how human bodies “should” inhabit lateral space and argue that they follow from dexterocentrism. This focus on *how* one uses one’s hands and *where in lateral space* this usage occurs is a unique approach to dexterocentrism, which researchers study primarily on the basis only of *which* hand one uses.

**Eric Rogers “Explicating Impact: Towards a General Definition of Impact in invasion biology”**

Impact is an important concept in the emerging field of invasion biology. However, despite a multiplicity of specific impact kinds in the scientific literature, a general account has remained elusive. Such an account is important if we want to understand its function in the context of invasion theory and praxis and the relation of impact to other important scientific and philosophical concepts. In this paper I explicate the concept of impact, with particular attention to its major qualitative and quantitative dimensions, with the goal of arriving at a satisfactory general definition. I argue that impact is best understood as a detectable, non-negligible effect expressed in a specified quantification scheme that is defined with reference to one of a set of valuable economic, health-related, or ecological attributes.

**Bradford Stockdale “Two-Way Power: Still Susceptible to Luck”**

The problem of luck is one of the most formidable obstacles currently facing libertarian theories of free will. Some have argued that there is no problem, while others have argued that the problem is not a unique one for libertarians. Still others acknowledge the problem and aim to address it with their preferred libertarian theory. Helen Steward takes the latter strategy with her agency incompatibilism. She meets the problem head on and argues that agents who possess a two-way power, which is a power to either perform some action or refrain from performing it, avoid the problem of luck. If she is successful this would be a big point in favor of agency incompatibilism, and it could indicate a successful strategy for others to follow. I will argue that just as Steward insists that we ought to move from more robust abilities to the ability to refrain, the proponent of the problem of luck can do the same, and once doing so they can posit a very similar luck objection to refraining.

**J. Michael Barker “Whither Mechanism?”**

The claim that organisms are mechanically explicable is fundamental to the antinomy of judgment in the Dialectic of the *Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment*. A glancing review of commentary reveals that the Analytic of the *Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment* is dense in scholarly, philosophical, and interpretive opportunity. We learn from Kant that organisms are special in myriad, perhaps related, ways. Orthodox interpretations hold that Kant either employs a mechanical inexplicability claim as a premise of the arguments in sections

63-65, or that his discussion there includes reasoning, assertions, or assumptions that can be made sense of only by feats of scholarship from external sources substantiating a mechanical inexplicability premise in those passages. I argue that a close examination of the passages in sections 63-65 where Kant mentions “mechanism” employ no mechanical inexplicability claim as a premise. Rather, that claim emerges as a conclusion.

### **Sarah Vincent “On the Moral Actions and Moral Communities of Nonhuman Animals”**

Perhaps some animals enjoy a moral status other than moral patienthood. Taking up this challenge is Mark Rowlands’ account of a space between moral patienthood and moral agency – that of mere moral subjecthood. Herein, I challenge the adequacy of his criteria for moral subjecthood by arguing that the role of empathy is critically undertheorized therein, as is the role of the moral community. Herein, I both discuss empathy’s significance as a moral module and introduce the adaptivity criterion, which refers to the ability to respond to feedback about one’s behaviors from members of one’s moral community.

### **David M. DiQuattro “Access Problems and Virtue Ethics”**

Iris Murdoch, Sabina Lovibond, and John McDowell have developed a version of moral realism and virtue ethics in which the virtuous person is viewed as possessing an uncodifiable and intrinsically motivating sensitivity to the good. In the introductory section I introduce the notion of an access problem and suggest that moral formation as conceived by these philosophers is subject to an access problem. We face an access problem when in order to progress in knowledge and insight we must already possess the resources provided by the knowledge or insight we are trying to acquire. In subsequent sections I elaborate a second access problem stemming from Murdoch’s view that agents possess a deep-seated hostility to undertaking a process of moral formation. In the closing section I suggest two possible trajectories (Aristotelian and Platonic) for virtue ethics based on how seriously a given virtue ethicist takes this second access problem.

### **Lucas Worsham “The Interpretation of Love as Shared Meaning”**

The inquiry unfolding within the attached paper is concerned with developing an understanding of the notion of romantic love as it is conceived in the West. In order to do this the emphasis is on how the Ideal of Love as we have come to define it impacts the individual that finds their presence at one end of the relationship or the other. Sartre’s view is used as the frame through which the masculine side of the relationship has come to be thought of while Simone de Beauvoir offers the feminine perspective. The two sets of standards ascribe to either side are shown to be problematic due their being paradoxical when compared and contrasted against one another. In order to develop a better way of understanding the loving relationship the invocation of hermeneutics is utilized. The central argument is that 1) the Ideal of love does not offer anything tangible as far as understanding the nature of the particular loving relationship, and 2) by rejecting this understanding we can look to the dimension of language and deconstruct the idealized meaning to find something that is better suited for the particularities of the relationship characterized by love and affection.

### **Sophia Stone “Being in the *Phaedo*”**

We tend to think that Socrates’s argument for the immortality of the soul fails because of a problem with the last proof. I argue here that the problem represents a misunderstanding of Being in the *Phaedo*. In this paper, after I analyze the two classes of objects in the so-called affinity argument (*Phd.* 77e-80b), I argue for a third. I propose that what we call a particular is a bundle of

form characteristics, whereas a form just is its essential form characteristic. This leads to a third class of objects, the intermediates. Intermediates have properties of forms and particulars. An intermediate both has essential characteristics that it never loses as well as acquires inessential characteristics that it loses when it no longer occupies a body. Thus using the concept of Being from the historical Parmenides for forms avoids certain errors and invites reconsideration of the last argument.

### **Adam Hauptfeld “Access Internalism, Attention, and Perceptual Expertise”**

Unlike novices, perceptual experts about *x*s are capable of recognizing *x*s by their looks. Also unlike novices, experts have epistemic justification for believing that *x*s are *x*s on the basis of their perceptual experiences. Perceptual expertise appears to be a problem case for access internalism about justification because it's not obvious there is any evidence the expert has access to that the novice doesn't. The seemings view is an access internalist acceptable theory that maintains that experts have an additional conscious mental state that counts as evidence – a seeming. I criticize the seemings view and propose that Sebastian Watzl's theory of attention provides a superior resource for explaining the phenomenon of perceptual expertise.

### **Paul Carelli “Two Models for Including Non-Western Material in Introductory Philosophy Courses”**

With the growing concern for bringing diversity into the field of philosophy comes the need to include non-western sources in introductory level philosophy courses. I will discuss two possible models for such inclusions: the replacement model and the accommodation model. On the replacement model, a non-western source is used in place of a traditional western source. For example, the consequentialism of British utilitarianism is replaced by the consequentialism of the Mohist school of Classical Chinese philosophy. In the accommodation model, a non-western source is used not as a replacement for a western source, but as a representative of an area of concern not usually dealt with in the western tradition. For example, including a section on Confucian role ethics and the importance of family reverence for self-cultivation. I will argue that the accommodation model is preferable to the replacement model for at least three reasons: 1) the replacement model will tend to misrepresent the non-western tradition in question, 2) the accommodation model introduces not only new sources but also new areas of investigation, and 3) the accommodation model offers the opportunity to see the more traditional western sources in a new critical light.

### **Sarah Mattice “The Five Buddhist Precepts and Introductory Ethics”**

In my Introduction to Philosophy or Introductory Ethics (Contemporary Ethical Issues) courses, I often have students read a contemporary commentary on the Five Buddhist Precepts (no intentional killing, no lying, no sexual misconduct, no stealing, and no intoxication), and discuss them in the context of other ethical theories or concerns we have covered in the course. In this presentation I will explain how I introduce these Buddhist ideas/practices in my courses and how I connect them to other ethical theories the students are familiar with such as deontology, utilitarianism, and virtue ethics. I will also articulate some of the distinctive value I see in making non-western material a component in introductory courses, and discuss some of the particular challenges that come from building an introductory course that treats philosophy as a global phenomenon.

### **Aaron Creller “On Doubt with al-Ghazali and Descartes”**

The process of comparison need not make grand ahistorical leaps, and this presentation offers one example of including a sample of Islamic philosophical discourse through al-Ghazali's *Deliverance from Error* in dialogue with Descartes's *Meditations on First Philosophy*. I will provide a brief introduction to themes and questions common to both texts in the context of using them in an introductory course. Examples of questions and topics of interest to be examined include issues of human nature, the role of doubt in argument, and the relationship between the secular academy and historically religious texts.

### **Joseph Long “Does Non-cognitivism Entail Wishful Thinking?”**

According to Cian Dorr, non-cognitivism has the implausible implication that arguments like the following are cases of wishful thinking: If lying is wrong, then the souls of liars will be punished in the afterlife; lying is wrong; therefore, the souls of liars will be punished in the afterlife. Dorr further claims that if non-cognitivism implies that this "Liar Argument" and similar arguments are cases of wishful thinking, then non-cognitivism remains implausible even if one solves the so-called Frege-Geach problem. Dorr's claims have faced a number of objections, but I believe that Dorr is on to something. So, after summarizing Dorr's main argument, I (i) describe three flaws in what Dorr claims, (ii) offer a distinct objection to non-cognitivism, and (iii) draw on the preceding to show what Dorr's argument gets right and what it gets wrong.

### **Andrew Christman “Response to Ginet on Direct Reference and Anomic Action Explanation”**

One argument against incompatibilism proceeds as follows. First premise: we can explain free actions in terms of the agent's reasons for acting. Second premise: such explanations can only be given for determined events. Conclusion: free actions must be determined events. Carl Ginet (1989) tries to undermine this line of argument by developing an adeterministic (i.e. anomic) account of action explanation in terms of reasons. I argue that Ginet's account legitimizes a problematic type of action explanation. More specifically, I argue that it legitimizes action explanation in terms of intentions formed subsequent to the completion of the action. My argument proceeds as follows. First, I provide a general overview of Ginet's account. Second, I argue that this account legitimizes the type of action explanation described above. Third, I argue that this type of action explanation is problematic. Fourth, I conclude by briefly considering a potential solution to the problem.

### **David DiDomenico “Moral Perception, Inference, and Imagination”**

Recently there has been a growing interest among philosophers in the phenomenon of moral perception. In this paper, I defend the view that moral perception constitutively involves our capacities for reasoning and inference. The motivating thought behind the view is that there are important structural similarities between moral perception and the imagination of morally-laden scenarios.

### **Larry Moralez (UCF) “Enactive Neutral Monism”**

Extended cognition theorists have turned to neutral monism to justify extending the constituents of conscious experience into the body and environment. They claim that doing so deflates the hard-problem of consciousness. However, a metaphysical and scientifically supported account of what neutral monism is such that it can adequately account for subject and object does not accompany their claims. I argue that their positions can be better understood through the philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead. I show that Whitehead's metaphysics accounts for subject and object via a universal creative mechanism within a inherently interrelated world. Furthermore,

I will illustrate how Heisenberg's interpretation of quantum theory empirically supports this mechanism. I then re-construct neutral monism into the thesis that there is one interrelated world and that what is neutral is a universal creative process. I conclude that this "enactive" neutral monism better suits the arguments of the extended cognition theorists.

### **Ofelia Schutte "At the Margins of the History of Philosophy: Appeals to Reason by Sor Juana and Avellaneda."**

In this talk I consider the main arguments on behalf of women's emancipation and recognition in education and culture presented by two major Hispanic American writers: Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz (in 17th century Mexico) and Gertrudis Gómez de Avellaneda (in 19th century Cuba and Spain). I examine the concepts of reason they relied on in light of the challenges they faced in their times. As a basis for further discussion I offer some critical reflections on the relevance of these issues today.

### **Sungwoo Um "Solving the Puzzle of Partiality"**

Many of us share the intuition that partial treatment in favor of our intimates is at least permissible, if not obligatory. But if each person is equally valuable, as the prevailing modern conception of morality suggests, it seems difficult to explain how the fact that someone happens to share some relationship with us make a difference to how we ought to treat her, or how we may permissibly treat her. To solve this puzzle, Simon Keller argues for the individuals view on partiality, according to which the reasons of partiality arise from facts about the ethical importance of the individuals who share special relationships with us. In this paper, I argue that he fails both to capture the phenomenology of partiality and to make a convincing case for understanding facts about special relationships as enablers rather than as reason-giving facts themselves, and then suggest my own relational activity view as an alternative.

### **Marija Jankovic and Greg Ray "Meaning, Publicity and Knowledge"**

Donald Davidson and W.V. Quine held a strong view about the relationship between publicity and linguistic meaning. Public languages are public and both held that linguistic meaning was subject to a kind of epistemic cap owing to this publicity: Epistemic Thesis (ET): There can be nothing more to linguistic meaning than can be determinately known on the basis of publicly available evidence. This thesis has far-reaching consequences, including a well-known indeterminacy thesis: Linguistic meaning is substantially indeterminate. But what reason have we for accepting ET? Davidson and Quine make an intuitive appeal on its behalf that many have apparently found persuasive. We think this intuitive motivation involves a largely unexamined presupposition about the relation between meaning and public knowledge — about the epistemic requirements of linguistic communication. We will argue that this presupposition should not be accepted out of hand and give positive reason to think it is in fact false.

### **Justin Capes "Death, Betrayal, and a Guardian Angel"**

A familiar Epicurean argument for the conclusion that death (i.e., being dead) isn't bad for those who die goes like this. The dead can't experience anything, including being dead and its effects. But something is bad for an individual only if that person can experience it or its effects. Hence, death isn't bad for those who die. In this article, I consider several alleged counterexamples to this argument's second premise, the experience requirement, along with some responses to them. The responses aren't entirely without merit, as we'll see. However, I contend

that even if none of the cases cited are straightforward counterexamples to the experience requirement, they can be used to challenge that principle indirectly. I conclude that the Epicurean argument is unsound.

### **Laurie Shrage “Integration vs. Desegregation”**

Two prominent philosophers, Elizabeth Anderson and Tommie Shelby, are in substantial disagreement about what should be done to address pervasive and persist residential racial segregation. In this paper, I will explore the philosophical sources of their disagreement, how far apart their views actually are, and the strengths and weaknesses of each thinker’s views. I will try to show how the differences between their views can point the way toward better policies and programs for addressing ongoing anti-black discrimination and disadvantage.

### **David McNaughton & Piers Rawling “Impartiality and Duties of Special Relationship”**

What is the position of personal relationships within morality? A common complaint is that two major types of ethical theory – direct act consequentialism and Kantianism – construe morality as being impartial in a manner that gives short shrift to the nature and moral significance of personal relationships in general, and friendship in particular. Is this true? We conclude that the answer is ‘yes’. On the way to this conclusion, we explore some criteria for impartiality, the definition of direct act consequentialism as an agent-neutral moral theory, and the Kantian views of Marcia Baron, Barbara Herman, Christine Korsgaard, and T. M. Scanlon – our focus in all these cases, of course, being whether the view in question can properly accommodate our obligations to our nearest and dearest.

### **James Gilesie “Staying Safe with Sensitivity”**

One attempt by epistemologists to circumvent issues raised by Gettier cases and skeptical hypotheses is to impose modal conditions on knowledge which remove the element of luck responsible for Gettier cases. These modal, anti-luck conditions fall into two general categories: sensitivity theories and safety theories. The latter theories have largely been favored, partially due to arguments which contend that sensitivity fails to capture the anti-luck intuition and is not a necessary condition for knowledge. This essay argues the contrary: that sensitivity, not safety, is a necessary condition for knowledge. The arguments raised against sensitivity primarily root from Nozick’s construal of sensitivity which requires a denial of closure. A proper construal of sensitivity is thus offered which retains closure and circumvents the objections. Finally, an argument is provided showing that, safety fails to capture the anti-luck intuition while sensitivity’s remains unscathed, providing a prima facie case for sensitivity over safety.

### **Steven Starke “A Suggested Taxonomy of Ethics”**

The general usage of the terms ‘morality’ and ‘ethics’ seems to indicate some distinction between them. What that distinction is, specifically, and how it applies to work within the field, is less clear. Eighty eight years ago, Harold N. Lee attempted to add some clarity to this deficit of definition. He differentiated ‘ethics’ from ‘morality’ from ‘morals’ and sets them in relation to each other in a hierarchy of theoretical abstractness. Both of these systems, the general use definitions and Lee’s system, attempt to address a deeper issue within the field of Ethics, i.e. getting clear on what we mean. I offer my own thoughts on this matter in hopes of settling the question of what ethicists intend when they make these field specific utterances.

### **Daniel Miller “In Defense of the Blameless Ignorance Principle”**

Randolph Clarke (forthcoming) recently offered an argument for the conclusion that *no* type of blameless ignorance excuses. Clarke argues that, because unwitting wrongdoers can reasonably have been expected to realize the wrongness of their behavior, they are without excuse. Given that some such agents are plausibly not blameworthy for the ignorance from which they act (or omit), every version the blameless ignorance principle is false. Against Clarke's argument, I will argue that blameless circumstantial ignorance excuses on the grounds that it precludes the expression or display of certain types of negative quality of will, which is a necessary condition on blameworthiness.

### **Joshua Myers “Does Phenomenal Consciousness Overflow Attention? An Argument from Feature-Integration”**

In the past two decades a number of arguments have been given in favor of the possibility of phenomenal consciousness without attentional access, otherwise known as phenomenal overflow. This paper will show that the empirical data commonly cited in support of this thesis is, at best, ambiguous between two equally plausible interpretations, one of which does not posit phenomenology beyond attention. Next, after citing evidence for the feature-integration theory of attention, I will give an account of the relationship between consciousness and attention that is consistent with both the empirical data and our phenomenological intuitions without positing phenomenal consciousness beyond attention. Having undercut the motivations for accepting phenomenal overflow along with having given reasons to think that phenomenal overflow does not occur, I end with the tentative conclusion that attention is a necessary condition for phenomenal consciousness.

### **Sally Ferguson “Evolutionary Psychology and the Taxonomy, Diagnosis and Treatment of Mental Disorders”**

Murphy and Stich advocate using the perspective of evolutionary psychology to radically revise the DSM, arguing that it will provide a better account of mental disorders and provide the means for more effective diagnosis and treatment. I describe some of the highlights of their account, with a special focus on several types of depressive disorders. I then turn to one particular weakness for the evolutionary psychologist's approach, involving the fundamental notion of the so-called "Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness" or EEA. I maintain that flaws in this foundational concept substantially impact an understanding of the evolution of human psychology including its accompanying mental disorders, undermining Murphy and Stich's claims.

### **Brook Sadler “Passion and Affect in Moral Life: Making Room for Emotion in Kantian Ethics”**

It is often charged that Kantian ethics is overly moralistic, coldly rational, unable to account for the value of emotions, and unable to accommodate the importance of personal relationships. My aim in this paper is modest: By calling attention to Kant's discussion of passions and affects, I hope to show that there is room in Kantian ethics for the emotions and that Kantian ethics is compatible with personal relationships. Further, I suggest that Kant's understanding of the emotions dovetails with contemporary cognitive accounts of emotion.

### **Gordon Cooper “Agent-Causal Libertarianism and Luck: A Response to Griffith”**

Meghan Griffith argues that luck objections targeting agent-causal libertarianism fail to show that agents lack the control that responsibility requires. Griffith's general strategy is to reject the purported theoretical link at the heart of the luck objection, that between action explanation

and agential control. I begin this paper by sketching the libertarian position and a luck objection against it. I then present and evaluate Griffith's rejoinders, two of which I reject, and one of which I concede. The conceded argument, it turns out, does not undermine the luck objection so much as it provides an opportunity to clarify and improve it.

### **Walker Page "Virtue Reliabilism and the Challenge of Defeat"**

Accounting for cases of defeat—cases where the epistemic status of a belief is somehow diminished—is challenging for reliabilist epistemologies because it's not immediately obvious how to analyze defeat in reliabilist terms. This paper considers three different ways that Virtue Reliabilism (VR) might try to meet the challenge of defeat. Section I articulates the characteristic features of VR, and identifies it as a species of Process Reliabilism. Section II details precisely what the challenge of defeat is. Roughly, the problem is that VR apparently implies that subjects have knowledge in cases involving defeat, even though, intuitively, they do not. Section III describes and evaluates three ways VR might meet this challenge, arguing that all three are inadequate. I conclude that this is a serious problem because it is not immediately obvious how VR is to resolve it, or even if there is a solution at all.

### **John Biro "Saving the Ship"**

In defending the startling claim that there are no artifacts, indeed, no inanimate material objects of the familiar sort, Peter van Inwagen has argued that as long as truths about such putative objects can be translated without remainder into truths that do not make essential reference to them, we should endorse only the ontological commitments of the translation. In this note I argue that the kind of translation van Inwagen recommends cannot meet his condition. Read one way, it loses us some truths. Read another, it entails the existence of the very object it is supposed to eliminate.

### **Marshall Thompson "Why Grownups Are Boring: How Everyday Acts Matter for an Immortal"**

Eternal life is often presented as more a curse than blessing. In particular many worry that everyday activities would lose all meaning if we live forever. In this paper I challenge that assumption, and attempt to vindicate the significance of everyday activities in the context of an eternal life. At the beginning I present the three most prominent arguments for why living forever would undermine the meaningfulness of everyday activities, first that endless repetition would make activities boring, second that it would sap us of motivation and third that eternal life is necessary for properly human significance. I then argue that all of these arguments share an essential problem of focusing too much on the experience of 'grown-ups' rather than children. If we refocus on childlike experience all three arguments can be shown to be mistaken, given wonder's enthralling character.

### **Gabriel De Marco "Manipulation and Intuitions: A Dilemma"**

One common way to argue for the incompatibility of determinism and moral responsibility is to present a case of an agent who has been manipulated in some way or other into performing some action and to argue that this sort of agent is not relevantly different from agents who are merely determined. A popular instance of this style of argument is the Zygote Argument, which employs a case involving Ernie, an agent who is manipulated. In this paper, I propose a dilemma for the proponent of the Zygote Argument: either the manipulation in the case of Ernie is relevant

to his responsibility or it is not. I argue that, whichever way the proponent of the Zygote Argument goes, they face some difficult challenges.

### **Mathew Taylor "Virtue and Right Revisited"**

Some versions of virtue ethics provide the following analysis of right action: an act is right just in case it is what a virtuous agent (acting in character) would do in the circumstances. Some philosophers have argued against this view by raising various counterexamples that threaten to falsify the proposed analysis of right action. Presumably, these counterexamples show that virtue ethical accounts of right action cannot accommodate commonsense intuitions concerning moral improvement, character defects, and moral dilemmas. In this paper, I will provide a novel argument for thinking that the purported counterexamples fail to undermine virtue ethical accounts of right action. I maintain that those who have raised the counterexamples are mistaken about what is implied by virtue ethical accounts of right action.

### **Keya Maitra "Feminism and the Debate over Mental Content"**

The main debate in mental content has focused on whether content is determined by factors internal to our mind or also by factors that are external. The exact import of the dichotomy between internalism and externalism for feminism will be the focus of my paper. Approaching this topic through the lens of feminist concerns allows us to see the limitation of the framing of this discussion in the mainstream philosophy of mind. Using Millikan's teleo-semantic theory of mental content as a starting point I will offer an ameliorative understanding of mental content.