philosophy book
The Routledge Handbook of Moral Epistemology
Sarah Vincent, Rebecca Ring, and Kristin Andrews authored the chapter entitled, “Normative Practices of Other Animals.”
Abstract:
Traditionally, discussions of moral participation – and in particular moral agency – have focused on fully formed human actors. There has been some interest in the development of morality in humans, as well as interest in cultural differences when it comes to moral practices, commitments, and actions.
The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Animal Minds
Sarah Vincent and Shaun Gallagher authored the chapter entitled, “From False Beliefs to True Interactions: Are Chimpanzees Socially Enactive?”
Abstract:
In their 1978 paper, psychologists David Premack and Guy Woodruff posed the question, “Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?” They treated this question as interchangeable with the inquiry, “Does a chimpanzee make inferences about another individual, in any degree or kind?”
Dimensions of Moral Agency
Sarah Vincent authored the chapter entitled, “The Myth of the Mental (Illness).”
Abstract:
Thomas Szasz has wrestled with the following question: Does mental illness even exist? Here, I sketch two provocative papers by Szasz and detail his reasons for criticizing the concept ‘mental illness.’ I will proceed to highlight where I think Szasz’s writing is philosophically dubious, despite its role in forcing us to think critically about ‘mental illness.’